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Abstract
This article focuses on the work of O. Chanel and G. Chichilnisky
(2013) [1] on the flaws of expected utility theory while assessing the value
of life. Expected utility is a fundamental tool in decision theory. However,
it does not fit with the experimental results when it comes to catastrophic
outcomes —see, for example, Chichilnisky (2009) [3] for more details. In
the experiments conducted by Olivier Chanel in 1998 and 2009, several
subjects are ask to imagine they are presented 1 billion identical pills.
They are paid $220,000 to take and swallow one, knowing that one out of
1 billion is deadly. The objective of this article is to show that risk aversion
phenomenon cannot explain the experimental results found. This is an
additional reason why a new kind of utility function is necessary: the
axioms proposed by Graciela Chichilnisky will be briefly presented, and it
will be shown that it better fits with experiments than any risk aversion
utility function.
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1 Introduction
One of the most commonly used frameworks for describing choices by economic
agents is Expected Utility. But what if one of the outcomes is death? Can
expected utility still be consistent with real-life choices? This question is fun-
damental when it comes to decision implying catastrophic outcomes. Based on
the experiments conducted by Chanel and Chichilnisky (2013) [1], issues raised
by the use of expected utility when confronted to rare and catastrophic events
are discussed.
In [1], several subjects are presented 1 billion identical pills. They are paid
$220,000 to take and swallow one, knowing that one out of 1 billion is deadly. In
this experiment conducted in 1998, about half of the subjects accept the deal,
and the other half refuses it. The following symbols will be used: the subject
has an initial wealth l, which corresponds to their life and of which the value
is yet to be determined. By accepting the deal, the subject is rewarded with
an amount r = 220000. With a probability p = 10−9, the subject dies (their
wealth becomes r), and with a probability 1 − p, the subject survives (hence
their wealth becomes l + r).
2 Using mean gain: linear preferences
At first, in [1], a naive approach is adopted. It is assumed that a subject who
refuses the deal automatically values their life at more than l0 = 220000/10
−9.
Why? Because the subject thinks that the value of their life is greater than
the mean gain m(p) they will get by taking the deal. This can be expressed as
follows:
m(p) = pr + (1− p)(l + r) < l
i.e. r < pl
which is equivalent to
l >
r
p
= l0 (1)
The value of l0 is much greater than the value of life that is generally ad-
mitted in literature, i.e. between $1.7 and $7 million [1]. The singularity of the
experiment results will be explained later on.
The computation which leads to (1) implicitly makes the assumption that
the utility function u is linear. Indeed, in expected utility theory, an economic
agent makes choices regarding the utilities of every outcome, not their gross
values. Hence, the only equation that can be inferred from the fact that the
subject refuses the deal is what follows:
pu(r) + (1 − p)u(l+ r) < u(l) (2)
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However, the result (1) is still valid if the utility function is linear. But this is
not generally true. By assuming that hypothesis, one of the effects that could
explain the singular experimental results is eliminated. Indeed, risk aversion
phenomenon could be the reason why subjects do not want to take a chance by
choosing a pill, even if the mean gain is greater than the value they assign to
their own lives.
Let us focus on a subject who would not mind accepting the deal, that is
to say who gets the same satisfaction either while swallowing the pill, or while
refusing the deal. The following equation is implied by this statement:
pu(r) + (1 − p)u(l+ r) = u(l) (3)
3 Utility functions with risk aversion
Risk aversion can simply be summed up by the famous saying “a bird in hand
is worth two in the bush”. An economic agent will generally prefer getting $100
in hard cash rather than playing head or tails and have 1 chance out of 2 to
gain $200. In general, if the mean value of a lottery p is v, then the utility of v
will be greater than the expected utility of the lottery p:
u(v) > EU(p) (4)
In terms of utility function, this is equivalent to say that u is a concave. It is
thus clear that inequation (4) is simply a Jensen inequality. Risk aversion can
be assessed, thanks to Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) measure A,
which is defined as follows:
A = −
u′′
u′
(5)
where u′ is the first derivative of u, and u′′ its second derivative. If the prefer-
ences are increasing and concave, A is positive.
3.1 Search of a consistent utility function
The objective of this section is to find a utility function which explains the re-
sults of the pill experiment. Some famous models will be proposed and their
parameters adjusted. Thanks to equation (3), for every utility function that is
used, the implied value of life l can be found. The tests will be made with two
kinds of utility function. The results are summed up in the following table 1,
which indicates the values of the parameter γ for which l is within the borders
of the value of a statistical life (i.e. between $1.7 and $7 million).
These are two examples of functions that can explain why some people refuse
the deal. They do not necessarily value their lives at more than $220 trillion:
maybe they just have a high risk aversion. It would be interesting to see whether
those utility functions are consistent with other lotteries.
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Table 1: Value of life depending on the utility chosen
expressions of u value of life
linear preferences u(x) = ax+ b 220000/10−9
constant ARA
u(x) = −e−γx γ = 10−5.53 l = 7.0× 106
A = γ γ = 10−4.86 l = 1.7× 106
variable ARA
u(x) = −x−γ γ = 5.3 l = 7.0× 106
A = (1 + γ)/x γ = 10 l = 1.7× 106
3.2 Test of various utility functions
Let us build a very simple test: this is a classic “head or tails” lottery. Head,
the subject wins $100. Tails, he wins $200. This is an interesting deal indeed.
The question is: how much is a subject ready to pay for such a lottery? The
following table shows the results, for the three reference functions.
Table 2: Value of the head or tails deal
expressions of u value of the deal
u(x) = ax+ b 150
u(x) = −e−x×10
−5
149.98
u(x) = −x−7 110.3
The third function seems inconsistent with day-to-day experiments: its risk
aversion is too high. A random subject would generally prefer to play the game
rather than being paid $110.3.
The exponential function, though, gives a relatively good result with respect
to the mean gain of the deal. For now, this seems to be a consistent utility
function which could explain the results of O. Chanel and G. Chichilnisky’s
experiments on the value of life.
4 The non-takers
4.1 Failure of expected utility
During the 1998 experiment and the one that followed in 2009, some subjects
not only refused the deal, but would not take a pill no matter what, and re-
gardless of the probability of the deadly pill. This is a response that cannot be
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explained by standard expected utility.
The utility function is necessarily increasing, so u(l+ r) > u(l). Hence:
lim
p→0
EU(p) = lim
p→0
[pu(r) + (1− p)u(l + r)] = u(l+ r) > u(l) (6)
The conclusion is that for every kind of utility function, and regardless of
risk aversion, there will always be a small enough probability p –or a big enough
stack of pills– such that the subject will accept to take the pill. The table 3
shows the probability thresholds for different risk aversions, given a value of life
of $2 million (the deal is acceptable if its value is over $2 million).
Table 3: Value of the pill deal
u(x) = −e−γx where γ =... probability p value of the deal
10−5 10−9 2.18× 106
10−4.9 10−10 2.04× 106
10−4.8 10−13 2.10× 106
The following graph describes the evolution of the value v given to the pill
deal according to the probability p of finding the deadly pill.
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The above data is not consistent with the results obtained with part of the
subjects. Indeed, some people will not accept to play under any conditions,
due to the catastrophic outcome that is death. Classic expected utility tends to
under-estimate the impact of such catastrophic events on our decision-making
(see [2] for other experimental evidence).
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There is a need for a utility function that takes into account catastrophic
events, even when probabilities are very low.
4.2 Taking into account catastrophic events
4.2.1 A new kind of utility function
In Chichilnisky (2009) [3], a new kind of utility function is proposed, which
takes into account events with arbitrarily small probabilities, but with huge
effects. To understand precisely what modifications has to be done to the clas-
sical expected utility, one has to define explicitly the underlying mathematical
framework.
A lottery is an essentially bounded function f ∈ L∞(R) which represents
the utility of every outcome x ∈ R. In order to rank the different lotteries, ex-
pected utility is defined by W (f) =
∫
R
f(x)dµ(x) where µ is a measure with an
integrable density function φ1 ∈ L1(R). W is a linear functional on the lottery
space. f is said to be “preferable to g” if and only if W (f) > W (g). The issue
is that this ranking is insensitive to rare events: it means that if a catastrophic
outcome is added to the lottery f , and its probability is low enough, the ranking
will not be modified.
Before introducing the new utility function found by G. Chichlnisky, one has
to remember that any linear functional on L∞(R) can be expressed as a Radon
integral, with respect to a measure that is absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure [4]. However, those Radon integrals can be expressed as
Lebesgue integrals if and only if that measure is σ-additive. Otherwise (i.e. if
the measure is additive but not σ-additive), the result cannot be expressed as
a Lebesgue integral. This has been proven among others by Fichtenholz and
Kantorovitch (1934) [4].
The inconsistency of expected utility is solved by Chichilnisky (2009) [3] by
modifying its expression and adding a second term. This time, a continuous
linear functional φ2 is introduced, and its associated measure µ is additive but
not σ-additive. The new form of the ranking is then:
W (f) =λ
∫
R
f(x)φ1(x)dx + (1− λ)〈φ2, f〉
W (f) =λ
∫
R
f(x)φ1(x)dx + (1− λ)
∫
R
f(x)dµ(x)
where λ ∈ ]0, 1[, φ1 ∈ L1(R) and µ a purely finitely additive measure.
It has been proven in Chichilnisky (2010) [5] that this new ranking is sen-
sitive to rare events, which means that it satisfies the appropriate axiom of
“sensitivity to rare events” [3], and therefore takes into account catastrophic
events. Let us build a utility function of this kind, in order to see its evolution
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according to the probability p of picking the deadly pill.
Let us take a simple framework: the preferences are linear. The preferences
function is
f : R −→ R+
f(x) =
{
r if x < 1
l + r if x ≥ 1
where l is the unknown value of life.
The “Lebesgue” part of the utility function shall be:
φ1(x) = p× χ[0,1/p](x)
Where χA is the characteristic function of the set A. The σ-additive measure
associated with φ1 is the uniform probability on [0, 1/p], so that there is a prob-
ability p to pick the [0, 1] interval.
At this stage, the results obtained would be the same that in Section 2, by
reasoning with the mean gain. Let us add the purely finitely additive part. Let
µ be the following measure:
∀A ⊂ R, µ(A) =
{
1 if ∃ N (o) ⊂ A
0 otherwise
N (0) is a “neighbourhood” of 0. The first condition can be understood as
“there exists an open interval centered on 0 that is entirely included in A”. By
using this definition, the measure 0 is assigned to the singleton {0}, so that the
measure µ is still absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
In [5], Chichilnisky shows that the measure µ is a purely finite additive
measure. The explicit definition of its associated linear functional φ2 on L∞(R)
is only given on the subspace CL∞ of all continuous functions f ∈ L∞(R) that
have a limit towards 0.
∀f ∈ CL∞, 〈φ2, f〉 = lim
x→0
f(x)
Since the chosen preferences are continuous at 0, the new utility function is
now:
W (f) =λ
∫
R
f(x)φ1(x)dx + (1 − λ)〈φ2, f〉
W (f) =λ [pr + (1− p)(l + r)] + (1− λ)× lim
x→0
f(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
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4.2.2 Application and numerical values
The value of W (f) has to be compared to l, in order to know if the game is
worth playing or not. As a reminder:
– l = $3,000,000
– r = $220,000
– p = 10−9
Let us write the utility of the deal as a function of p which depends on a
parameter λ ∈]0, 1[ :
Wλ(p) = λ [pr + (1− p)(l + r)] + (1− λ)r (7)
As in (6), let us see the evolution of W when the probability of the deadly
pill converges towards 0 (i.e. when the size of the pile expands towards infinity).
lim
p→0
Wλ(p) = lim
p→0
λ [pr + (1− p)(l + r)] + (1− λ)r
lim
p→0
Wλ(p) = λ(l + r) + (1− λ)r = λl + r (8)
Since λ < 1, it is impossible to determine at first if this limit is greater or
smaller than l: it depends on the value of λ. If λl + r < l, the deal cannot be
acceptable, regardless of how small p is. If λl + r > l, sometimes the deal will
be acceptable, sometimes it will not (depending on the probability p).
With the present parameters, the threshold is λ0 =
l − r
l
≈ 0.926: if λ is
smaller than this value, the subject will never accept the deal. If λ is greater,
sometimes they will, sometimes they will not.
The following graph shows evolution of the value of the deal with respect
to p, with two different given values of λ: one is greater than λ0, the other is
smaller.
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It is important to remark that λ is an intrinsic parameter of the utility func-
tion, while p is a parameter of the deal. Changing λ means changing the way the
agent evaluates risk. Different values of λ can explain the different behaviours
of the subjects: some accept the deal, others find the probability of death too
high, and others do not accept, regardless of how small p can be.
5 Concluding remarks
Various hypotheses have been raised in order to explain why some people refuse
some deals which have positive mean gains. In some cases, risk aversion could
be a solution: there exists concave expected utility functions that explain the
results obtained with some subjects during the pill experiment. Some of these
functions give coherent results with smaller lotteries too.
Some behaviours cannot however be described using expected utility theory.
By using a theory wich better takes into account catastrophic events, it is pos-
sible to explain the experimental results, including those which are inconsistent
with expected utility theory.
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